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1 Introduction
The Chinese Communist Party (the party) aims to
complete the transition to a socialist market econ-
omy by the year 2010 and to develop China eco-
nomically to the level of a middle-income country
by the middle of the 21st century The question
that arises is what impact economic development
with marketisation will have on China's political
system. This is probably one of the most important
issues for researchers of modern Chinese politics.
There are two approaches to considering the effect
of economic growth and marketisation on the
political system. The first is an approach from the
societal level. This pays attention to the social
effects of marketisation and growth, such as the
pluralisation of interests and the advent of a mid-
dle-class with heightened political consciousness,
and investigates the possibility of an eventual plu-
ralisation of politics. Influenced by research on
Eastern Europe where one-party rule collapsed,
there has been a lively discussion in the 1990s
about the advent of civil society in China. One
such study was conducted by Gordon White, Jude
Howell and Shang Xiaoyuan, who examined
China's budding civil society from a sociological
perspective (White, I-lowell and Shang 1996).
The second approach analyses changes to the state
or party, and discusses their causes and future
developments. Studies by native Chinese scholars
residing and working in Japan have recently
attracted attention. Tang Liang has elucidated the
relationship between the state and the party and
how it has been reformed, while Zhao Hongwei has
discussed the nature of China's political regime and
identified centrallocal relations as its major char-
acteristic (Tang 1997; Zhao 1998). My study
focuses on changes in the role of the party and its
organisational and personnel systems. I shall inves-
tigate the interrelationship between the three
dynamics of marketisation, changes in the political
and economic role of the party, and developments
in centrallocal relations.
Partystate and centrallocal relations have entered
a new phase in the era of marketisation. At the Third
Plenum of the Eleventh Party Central Committee in
1978, the party switched its central activity from
class struggle to economic development. The
Plenum communiqué criticised the defects of the
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economic management system, blaming the over-
concentration of power at the centre and in the party
(Chinese Communist Party Central Documents
Institute 1982:6-7). The communiqué argued for
enlarging the economic powers of the localities and
enterprises, and for altering the situation under
which the party substitutes for the government and
the government substitutes for the enterprise. Since
then, except for a period after the 4 June Tiananmen
Protest in 1989, the basic orientation of reform has
been to decentralise power to localities and enter-
prises and to do away with the party interference in
administrative and economic activities. Judging by
common sense, it seemed these were the natural
requirements of marketisation.
Since 1993, however, progress towards marketisa-
ion has brought about a new development in cen-
trallocal and partystate relations. First,
macroeconomic control by the centre has been rein-
forced, since the localities and enterprises took
advantage of the acceleration of reforms and
embarked on reckless projects in pursuit of their
own development, causing serious imbalances in
the national economy At the same time,
policymakers mobilised the party system to
enforce discipline among the localities. The role of
the party in marketisation was gradually reasserted,
and the central economic work conference in
December 1998 even called specifically for the
strengthening of party leadership in economic
activities (People's Daily, 10 December 1998).
Thus, after the advent of reform and opening-up,
the reduction of the party power and decentralisa-
don took place hand-in-hand; since 1993, however,
the party leadership and supervision has been
reinforced as part of the measures to strengthen
central control. While the contradiction between
socialism and the market economy has sharpened
along with marketisation, there has emerged an
ironic situation in which the party organisation has
to be called in for the smooth management of the
market economy
The major aim of this article is to analyse the polit-
ical economy of this development and investigate
the role of the party in the marketisation of modern
Party groups are the party organisations that are
established in non-party organs and function as the dc
facto leadership of those organs.
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China. In the following analyses, I shall examine the
politics of marketisation in the first half of the
1990s, focusing on the interaction between mar-
ketisation, changes in the party's role, and develop-
ments in centrallocal relations. Then 1 shall
investigate the reassertion of the party's role since
the eruption of the Asian financial crisis, and dis-
cuss some specific measures which appear to
embody a modern Chinese resolution of the contra-
diction between socialism and the market economy
2 The Politics of Marketisation in
the First Half of the 1 990s
The strengthening of the party's political and eco-
nomic role has happened twice since the advent of
reform and opening-up. First, there was an attempt
to strengthen party leadership in all areas of poli-
tics, economy and society after the 4 June Incident
in 1989. There was no more official talk of separat-
ing the party and government, and party groups1,
which had been abolished in some of the central
ministries, were revived. In addition, it was decided
to reverse the decline in the role of party organisa-
tions within enterprises and to reinforce the party's
leadership of mass organisations. Also, the new
leadership emphasised the importance of a planned
economy and attempted to reinforce central control
over the economy through planning.
In early 1992, Deng Xiaoping embarked on his
'southern tour' to reverse the setback of reform.
Deng successfully called for a bold promotion of
reforms and consequently there was a surge in
marketisation and opening-up policies. However,
although growth was accelerated, serious imbal-
ances emerged in the macroeconomy caused by
over-investment in some sectors by local authori-
ties and enterprises. To tackle this problem, since
mid-1993 Zhu Rongji has attempted to strengthen
macro-control of the national economy through the
establishment of fiscal and monetary systems.
Nevertheless, it has proved difficult to enforce dis-
cipline among the localities and enterprises
through conventional means. Thus, the second
expansion of the role of the party was introduced
in the context of progress in marketisation and the
strengthening of central control through fiscal and
monetary means. In this section, 1 shall review the
development of arguments and conflicts over
reform policies at the centre since the late 1980s
and clarify the difference in the political and eco-
nomic settings in which the two expansions of the
party's role took place.
2.1 Late 1980s - early 1990s: a setback in
marketisation
The party's role was enlarged after the 4 June
Incident in 1989. This was a reaction against the
programme of political system reform adopted by
the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987. The pro-
gramme, drafted under the auspices of Zhao
Ziyang, included specific measures to restrict the
role of the party These included: abolishing party
organisations that functionally overlap with govern-
ment organs; gradually abolishing party groups in
government departments; (preventing the Party
Committee for Discipline and Inspection handling
cases relating to legal and administrative regula-
tions;) establishing a civil service system, and
putting an end to the party's appointment of offi-
cials and leaders of mass organisations and state
enterprises. While the party organisations of some
enterprises had been under the vertical leadership
of higher-level party organs, a decision was made
gradually to switch their leadership to the local
party committee. This was considered conducive to
the separation of party and government.
The arguments of Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang
for a separation of party and state included their
assertion that this would not only improve admin-
istrative efficiency but actually strengthen party
leadership. They argued that if the party engaged in
front line' administrative work, it was likely to
become directly involved in various contradictions.
Therefore, it could play the role of managing the
overall situation and coordinating various interests
and ideas only if it stood aloof and above adminis-
trative work. At the same time, it could effectively
provide supervision and prevent bureaucratism
only if it kept some distance from the government.
Deng and Zhao also asserted that party leadership
meant political leadership, namely, making impor-
tant policy decisions and recommending candidates
According to Chen this document was drafted under
the order of Song Ping, the then director of the
department.
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for important posts in state organs. In fact, such
arguments for the separation of party and state were
not directly related to marketisation. Por instance,
they had also been made in the Soviet Union since
the 1970s (Hill 1984). In the view of Deng and
Zhao at the time, however, swift marketisation had
been hampered by the bureaucratism of the swollen
state-party apparatus, and political reforms, includ-
ing the separation of the party and the state, were
indispensable for the promotion of economic
reforms (Deng 1993:176-80).
It was inevitable that these attempts at political
reform were met with opposition from within the
party For instance, the Party Central Organisation
Department, which is in charge of personnel affairs,
produced a document in 1988 claiming that condi-
tions were not yet ripe to implement a civil service
system (Chen 1990:119).2 According to Jiang
Zemin, who assumed the post of party General
Secretary after the 4 June Incident, many comrades
of the organisational front had resisted the mistakes
of Zhao Ziyang, who had weakened party leader-
ship (Liao et al. 1991:997). Premier Li Peng went
further and asserted that Zhao had actually tried to
eliminate the leadership of the party (Liao et al.
199 1:998). Thus, many of the measures adopted at
the Thirteenth Party Congress were reversed. Party
groups in government departments were revived,
party committees within enterprises were again
endorsed to take part in important decisions con-
cerning enterprise management, the party's leader-
ship of mass organisations was reinforced, and the
shifting of enterprise party organisations from
under the leadership of the party organisations of
upper-level administrative departments to that of
local party committees was halted. Ever since this
reversal, the separation of party and state has not
been officially discussed except in some localities
experimenting with reform of party and govern-
ment organs (Central Committee for Organisation
and Staff 1993:377-405).
As for economic reforms, price reforms were frozen
from the autumn of 1988 and stringent fiscal and
monetary policies were implemented. As a result,
inflation was contained, but the growth rate
declined and failed to pick up, despite the relaxing
of monetary policy At this point, conflict emerged
over the appropriate approach to achieving a more
efficient distribution of resources. Some argued for
the strengthening of directive planning and central
control over investment and goods, while others
insisted on promoting marketisation. The former
option became dominant among the top leadership
and in academia. At a time when socialist regimes in
Eastern Europe were collapsing, the argument
became influential that difficulties in those coun-
tries, as well as the mistakes of Zhao Ziyang, all
stemmed from setting marketisation as the goal of
reform. Deng Xiaoping repeatedly refuted the argu-
ment that identified the planned economy with
socialism and the market economy with capitalism.
From April to September 1991, however, organised
criticisms were levelled on writings that were based
on Deng remarks (Wu 1992:22-3, 137-8).
In sum, marketisation, the role of the party, and
centrallocal relations from the late 1980s to the
early 1990s were as follows. Deng Xiaoping and
Zhao Ziyang promoted the separation of party and
government, and of the party and enterprise man-
agement, with a view to strengthening party leader-
ship and overcoming the bureaucratism that was
hampering marketisation. Also, they decided to
cancel the leaderfollower relationship between the
party organisations of upper-level administrative
bodies and those within the subordinate enter-
prises, in order to reinforce the command of local
party committees vis-à-vis the command of vertical
departmental systems. Within the party, however,
there was strong resentment against these reforms
especially in the Organisation Department, whose
vested institutional interest was at risk. Among the
six members of the Politburo Standing Committee,
newly selected in the wake of the 4 June Incident,
General Secretary Jiang Zemiri, Premier Li Peng,
Vice-Premier Yao Yilin, and Director of the Central
Organisation Department, Song Ping, were in
favour of the reversal of the policy to separate the
party and the government. Li Peng, Yao Yilin and
probably others supported the implementation of a
centrally planned economy Thus, expansion of the
party's role and reinforcement of central control by
planning, rather than marketisation, became main-
stream policy
In percentages, they were 14.2 in 1992, 13.5 in 1993,
12.6 in 1994 and 10.5 in 1995.
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2.2 After 1992: progress in marketisation
Deng Xiaoping acted with a sense of crisis over the
reversal of reform policies when he made his
inspection tour in January/February 1992 of
Shenzhen and Zhuhai, two of the three Special
Economic Zones in Guangdong Province. He called
for the liberation of thinking from the shackles of
ossified ideology and for the acceleration of bold
reforms, with a view to defining the political
keynote for the Fourteenth Party Congress to be
held in the autumn. Since the domestic propa-
ganda department was under the influence of anti-
reform forces and uncooperative towards Deng, it
was the Hong Kong media that first reported
Deng tour and his remarks. The localities, which
had been suffering from lagging economic growth,
responded strongly and in February seventeen
provinces declared they would accelerate reform
(Ling 1998:187). In March, the centre did a politi-
cal about turn, and the Politburo issued a commu-
nique fully agreeing with Deng's remarks. The
Fourteenth Party Congress in October declared for
the first time that the target of reforms was to estab-
lish a socialist market economy On the other hand,
there was no change in the judgement that those
viewpoints and measures that questioned, negated
or weakened the leading role of the party were all
fundamentally mistaken. The pre-4 June policies
which restricted the role of the party were not
revived.
The remarkable progress in marketisation in the
wake of Deng's so-called southern tour brought
about a staggering rise in the economic growth rate.
The rate of increase in GDP was in double-figures
for four consecutive years from 1992 to 1995. On
the other hand, local leadership at various levels
engaged in the reckless development of their local-
ities with no consideration for macroeconomic bal-
ances, resulting in the overheating of the economy
For instance, not only provincial-level localities but
county-level localities nationwide constructed so-
called development zones with a major aim to
attract foreign capital. There were 1900 of them by
September 1992 (Daily China News, 1 October
1992). The localities also liberally granted permis-
sion to establish non-bank financial institutions,
which, together with financial malpractices such as
illegal inter-bank loans and careless lending, caused
financial disorder. As a result, inflation was aggra-
vated, government bonds were left unsold, and a
number of national construction projects were not
implemented because the localities diverted the
funds for their own purposes.4 The localities
actively promoted and in many cases implemented
development projects that contributed to enhancing
growth and employment in the region. In particu-
lar, they were keen to carry out projects that
ïncreased their revenue. A sense of competition was
strong among the localities, which each insisted
that their economy was not overheated even though
others' were (Wen Hui Bao (Hong Kong), 5 July
1993; Ling 1998:323).
Faced with this situation, Vice-premier Zhu Rongji
took the initiative and sought the implementation
of bold reforms. In early 1993, a conflict of opin-
ion between premier Li Peng and Zhu about the
pace of reform was brought to light. At the closing
session of the national meeting of local bank and
insurance firm managers in January Li argued that
specialised banks had to continue providing
unprofitable loans to achieve policy aims, while
Zhu insisted that they should swiftly separate the
investment banks for policy purposes from the
commercial banks (People's Daily, 18 January
1993). It was at this sensitive time that Li took sick
leave, and Zhu took over and brought in monetary
and fiscal measures to strengthen macroeconomic
control. For instance, control of the People's Bank
over the localities was strengthened by further
restricting the provincial branches' ability to allo-
cate credit. It was also decided that loans from the
People's Bank to specialised banks were to be made
mainly from headquarters and only loans for the
purchasing of agricultural products were left to the
provincial branches. The central bank system was
provided with a legal basis by the China Central
Bank Law of February 1995. The Commercial Bank
Law, promulgated in July that year, stipulated the
independent status of the former specialised banks
which were now expected to be more prudent in
making their loans. Also a bold step was taken in
reforming the fiscal and taxation systems to suit the
needs of a market economy An epoch-making
measure was the 1994 tax reform which aimed to
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increase central revenue. The centre had failed to
bring it in for ten years and it was only made pos-
sible at this time after Zhu Rongji persuaded local
leaders one-by-one (Takahara 1997).
From the above analysis, we can see that economic
policy shifted from one which paid great attention
to planning to one which promoted growth with
the direct participation of local authorities, and
then to one which paid utmost attention to main-
taining macroeconomic balances by central con-
trol through fiscal and monetary systems. It is
worth noting that central control through non-
planning methods was supported by personnel
policies. In July 1993, for example, Vice-Premier
Zhu Rongji gained an additional office by replac-
ing Li Peng's supporter, Li Guixian, as Governor of
the People's Bank. In July and August that year, ten
work groups, whose members included the direc-
tor and deputy-directors of the central organisa-
tion department, were dispatched by the Party
Centre and the State Council to twenty provincial-
level localities to inspect and press for the imple-
mentation of central directives (Wen Hui Bao
(Hong Kong) 15 July 1993; Zheng 1994: 1, 55;
Ling 1998: 322). At the same time, the Director of
the Central Commission for Discipline and
Inspection also personally led an inspection team
to particularly problematic localities (South China
Morning Post, 15 August 1993).
Thus, while some people were arguing for the
strengthening of macroeconomic control through
legislation, in order effectively to implement macro-
economic control over the national economy, where
'rule by person' prevails over 'rule by law', and
where the party fully controls personnel affairs,
there was little choice but to rely on the party sys-
tem to enforce discipline. That is, as reform policy
developed from a pattern that emphasised the pro-
motion of economic growth by entrepreneurial
localism to one that paid more attention to achiev-
ing macroeconomic balances and efficiency by
financial centralism, there was a greater need to
mobilise the organisational and personnel system of
the party, in place of the underdeveloped legal sys-
tem, to enforce economic discipline among the
localities.
For instance, only 20% of the funds actually reached billion yuan in total, while not a single yuan was
the key construction projects of the Ministry of provided to the 22 key construction projects of the
Electricity by June 1993. The projects were to cost 10.2 Ministry of Coal.
3 The Asian Financial Crisis and
the Reinforcement of Party
Organisation
The question of the maintenance of financial order
attracted attention once again after the so-called
Asian financial crisis. The economic and currency
crises of the Asian countries that erupted in 1997
were regarded first of all as financial crises by the
Chinese. In this section, we examine the establish-
ment of a new party organisation, the Central
Financial Work Committee (FWC), which was
assigned a significant new role in the process of
marketisation.
The economic and currency crises in Asia, trig-
gered by the Thai Baht crisis in July 1997, struck
the Chinese leaders who had been trying to emu-
late the rapid growth of the NIEs and ASEAN
countries. In particular, since the cause of the
crises was identified to be in the financial area,
they were urged to come up with effective mea-
sures to tackle the latent financial crisis in China.
In fact, as early as August 1996, Jiang Zemin and
the Central Leading Small Group on Finance and
Economics had received the work report on finan-
cial risks and their solutions (People's Daily, 14
January 1999). In February 1997, the Party Centre
decided to draft a document and hold a special
meeting on preventing financial risks. The first
conference jointly convened by the Party Centre
and the State Council after the Fifteenth Party
Congress was the National Financial Work
Conference in November 1997.
The specific problems of China's financial system
were as follows (People's Daily, 21 November
1998; People's Daily, 25 December 1998). First
was the high percentage of bad loans. The per-
centage of bad loans of the four state-owned com-
mercial banks, that is the Bank of Industry and
Commerce, the Bank of Agriculture, the Bank of
China and the Bank of Construction, was 24.4 at
the end of 1996, and rose to 29.2 by the end of
June 1997 (Li 1998). Second, there were cases of
illegal financial institutions and non-financial
institutions engaging in finance. Third, there was
too much speculation in the stock market. Fourth,
Li is a member of the Economics Group of the Central
Policy Institute, the think-tank of the Party Centre, and
her data should be more reliable than others'. According
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a lack of supervision and personnel management
led to financial crimes and misdemeanours or
incompetent behaviour, resulting in losses to the
financial institutions.
The causes of these problems included the follow-
ing: the soft-budget constraint of state enterprises
had not been reformed and the loans that they had
taken out were regarded as fiscal allocations which
did not have to be repaid; the financial institutions
themselves lacked a sense of risk; the system of
supervision and management, including the legal
system, was not developed in the fïnancial sector;
and local authorities intervened in the activities of
the financial department, which, in principle, were
under the vertical control that extended from the
centre. Such intervention undermined the indepen-
dence and effectiveness of the Peopleb Bank in
implementing financial policies and supervising the
financial sector (People's Daily, 21 December 1998).
The financial reformers led by Zhu Rongji
attempted to solve these problems by introducing
further reform. According to Dai Xianglong, cur-
rent governor of the People's Bank, the most seri-
ous lesson they learnt from the Asian financial
crisis was the need for a sound banking system
(People's Daily, 17 January 1998). Therefore, three
significant reform measures were adopted in
1998. First, in order to standardise the relation-
ship between the government, the bank and the
enterprise, a bold reform of the central govern-
ment was implemented and a number of min-
istries in charge of production and circulation
abolished. A similar reform is to take place in the
provincial- and prefectural-level localities in 1999
and in county- and township-level localities in
2000. Second, with a view to enhancing man-
agers' operational independence and their aware-
ness of profits and losses, the commercial banks
were no longer subject to the lending quota
defined by the People's Bank, and were to manage
their loans using indicators such as the debt/asset
ratio. And third, in order to get rid of local inter-
vention and enhance the authority and supervi-
sory independence of the Central Bank, the
provincial-level branches of the People's Bank
were abolished and nine regional branches, each
to Li, the percentage of bad loans in Thailand was 7.9,
and that in Indonesia 17, much lower than in China.
covering two to five provinces, were established
(People's Daily, 16 November 1998).6
Also worth noting was the establishment of the
FWC and the Financial Institutions System Party
Committees, which aimed to establish a vertical
command system extending from the centre to the
local branches of the financial institutions (People's
Daily, 22 June 1998; Outlooh, 6 July 1998: 28). The
PWC, which is stipulated as an agency of the Party
Central Committee, is not directly engaged in finan-
cial work itself. Its terms of reference include secur-
ing the thorough implementation of the policies and
instructions of the party and the State Council;
appointing and removing, in cooperation with the
central organisation department, those cadres in the
financial department whose posts are under central
management; supervising the leading cadres of the
financial department at various levels; and coordi-
nating the opinions of party committees in financial
institutions and local party committees. The former
party groups in the financial institutions were con-
currently upgraded to party committees, by which a
chain of command was established linking party
committees from the FWC at the top to the local
branches of each financial institution at the bottom
layer of its organisational hierarchy There would be
vertical command in personnel affairs as well.
However, in appointing the leading cadres of the
nine regional branches of the People's Bank and
those of the provincial-level branches of other finan-
cial institutions, the opinions of the local party com-
mittees at the branch sites were sought. Moreover,
the FWC was to act as an intermediary if the local
party committee did not agree with the views of the
party committees of the financial institutions.
Thus, the financial centralists who held the upper
hand in policy-making heightened the sense of cri-
sis in the face of the Asian financial crisis and the
aggravation of China's financial problems. At the
same time, they shrewdly took advantage of the cri-
sis and promoted systemic reforms to strengthen
central control. Significantly, an important method
that was adopted by the central leadership to
The nine new regional branches (and the provinces
that they cover) are as follows: Tianjin (Tianjin, Hebei,
Shanxi, Inner-Mongolia); Shenyang (Liaoning, Jilïn,
Heilongjiang); Shanghai (Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian);
Nanjing (Jiangsu, Anhui); Jinan (Shandong, Henan);
Wuhan (Jiangxi, 1-lubei, Hunan); Guangzhou
29
achieve this was the reinforcement and mobilisation
of party organisations. That is, while the scale and
role of finance, a core element of the market econ-
omy, increased substantially, it became obvious that
the economic and legal systems to support the
orderly functioning of the financial system were
lacking. In order swiftly to make up for this defect,
there was no better way than to mobilise the party
organisations which were the most effective instru-
ment for maintaining the discipline of localities and
financial institutions.
4 Conclusion
Twenty years after the advent of reform, an authori-
tative answer has not yet been given to the most
important question of what the leadership of the
party should look like in a market economy On the
one hand, those who attach great importance to effi-
ciency and to the economy insist that the role of the
party should be separated from those of the govern-
ment and the enterprise, and that the party should
concentrate its efforts on the coordination of various
interests, stand aloof from daily work, preside over
the overall situation and strengthen its supervision
over government officials and enterprise managers.
On the other hand, there are others who believe
power and politics to be more important, fear the
undermining of party leadership and the socialist
system by marketisation, and argue for the mainte-
nance of party leadership over the government and
the enterprise as in the days of the planned econ-
omy The Jiang Zemin administration is unable to
decide which position to take, since the socialist
market economy which they aim to establish is sup-
posedly a system in which party leadership, public
ownership and the market coexist. As is clear from
the above analyses, however, there is a growing gap
between political and economic principles in prac-
tice. We cannot but point out that there is an inher-
ent contradiction in Deng Xiaoping theory
We should not forget that marketisation is also
making an impact on another important area of the
political system, namely, centrallocal relations. The
tug-of-war between the centre and localities over
(Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan); Chengdu (Sichuan,
Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet); Xian (Shaanxi, Gansu,
Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang). The Department of Business
Management and the Department of Chongqing
Business Management of the headquarters arc in charge
of Beijing and Chongqing, respectively
power and interest was of course taking place regu-
larly under the planned economy This was intri-
cately related to the relationship between the party
and the state. In the days of planning, the strength-
ening of party leadership vis-à-vis the government
meant the strengthening of the power of the local
party committee against the vertical departmental
system of the government. In accordance with the
transition from plan to market, however, there
emerged a new combination of centrallocal and
partystate relations. As far as centrallocal rela-
tions were concerned, there was a new pattern of
conflict. The tug-of-war was fought between finan-
cial centralism on the one hand, which aimed at
achieving macroeconomic balances by stronger cen-
tral control, not through planning but through fis-
cal and monetary policies, and entrepreneurial
localism on the other, which placed priority on
measures that were advantageous to regional devel-
opment and increased local revenue and employ-
ment. Under this situation, the financial system
failed to function properly due to the intervention
of localism. The central leadership, which was par-
ticularly concerned with the impact of the Asian
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